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I. INTRODUCTION
The flagship of the Civil Justice Reform Act is the expense and delay
reduction plan, which each of the federal judicial districts has been required to
develop and implement. These plans and their contents all but monopolized
debate during the legislative process, and have all but monopolized
commentary on the Act since its passage. Slipping by relatively unnoticed 2 was
a new section 476 to title 28:
2 One notable exception to the lack of attention otherwise lavished upon § 476, is an
insightful article by Professor R. Lawrence Dessem. See R. Lawrence Dessem, Judicial
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§ 476. Enhancement of judicial information dissemination
(a) The Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts shall prepare a semiannual report, available to the public,
that discloses for each judicial officer -
(1) the number of motions that have been pending for more than
six months and the name of each case in which such motion has
been pending;
(2) the number of bench trials that have been submitted for more
than six months and the name of each case in which such trials
are under submission; and
(3) the number and names of cases that have not been
terminated within three years after filing.3
The modest objective of this article is to analyze § 476 in light of the purpose
it was designed to serve, and to evaluate the performance of that section during
the two years that it has been in operation. To do that, it is useful to begin by
placing § 476 in the larger context of ongoing efforts to address and remedy
indefensible decision-making delays. Section II will, therefore, summarize the
causes of decision-making delay, dividing them among the defensible and the
indefensible, and then review existing mechanisms for alleviating indefensible
delay. The point worth underscoring is that while defensible
delays-particularly delays occasioned by burgeoning caseloads-are
undeniably the most significant source of decision-making delay, they are not
the only source. Section 476 may properly be understood as the latest in a series
of efforts to reduce indefensible delays-delays precipitated by nonstructural
inefficiency, indecision, inertia, belligerence or disability.
Section III will track the development and implementation of § 476. While it
is still too early to reach any firm conclusions as to the ultimate success of the
section in reducing indefensible delay, preliminary findings are encouraging;
delays are declining, and judges appear to be acknowledging that the impact
of the section is salutary. Even at this early date, then, the evidence may be
sufficient to justify Congress in lifting the sunset provision as it applies to § 476.
II. DECISION-MAKING DELAY IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: LOOKING BEYOND THE
CASELOAD CRISIS
A. Causes of Decision-Making Delay
Decision-making delay, as a longstanding problem confronting the federal
courts, has been discussed elsewhere-so much so, in fact, that no fashionably
dressed court reform scholarship (including my own) is complete without a
Reporting Under The Cvil Justice Reform Act: Look, Morn, No Cases!, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 687
(1993).
328 U.S.C. § 476(a)(1)-(3) (1993).
19931
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
tasteful accessory, around which the rest of the ensemble is frequently
coordinated, highlighting delay-related crises within the federal courts.
1. Defensible Delay
In the category of defensible delay are grouped those causes that are beyond
the judges' control, or that may otherwise be justified as necessary or
appropriate. As indicated below, a variety of measures have been proposed or
implemented to alleviate defensible delays. With the possible exception of
provisions authorizing expanded use of alternative dispute resolution,
however (which may serve to reduce caseload and overcome certain
delay-inducing structural inefficiencies), the Civil Justice Reform Act attacks
indefensible delay. A brief discussion of defensible delay is nevertheless
appropriate, if only to place in context the Civil Justice Reform Act and the
solutions it proposes.
a. Excessive Caseload
As suggested by the myriad of causes identified here, decision-making delay
is in fact a relatively complex phenomenon. It is, however, frequently traced to
a single cause: docket congestion resulting from a massive influx of cases. The
Federal Courts Study Committee, for example, attributed the current "crisis of
the federal courts" to a recent surge in criminal case filings. As a result, the
average number of cases assigned to each judge has increased dramatically,
and the average time it takes to process a case from filing to disposition has
lengthened considerably.4
Delays occasioned by docket congestion are not, strictly Speaking, beyond
the judge's control. She can after all, decide fifty cases in the same time it would
otherwise take to decide five, simply by reducing the amount of time devoted
to each case. Nevertheless, such delays are clearly defensible, insofar as there
is realistically a minimum quantity of time that must be devoted to each case
to permit competent, conscientious and just decision-making.
Widespread acceptance of the proposition that decision-making delay is
correlated to court workload has led many commentators to recommend either
increasing the size of the federal judiciary or restricting case inflow, to alleviate
delays.5 To the extent that delay is attributable to workload, such
4 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMrIrEE, at 46 (1990).
51d. at 421. See also, RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRIsIs AND REFORM,
59-64 (1985); Robert Kastenmeier & Charles Geyh, The Case in Support of Legislation
Facilitating the Consolidation of MassAccident Litigation: a View From the Legislature, 73
MARQ. L. REv. 535, 543-46 (1990); Jon Newman, 1000 Judges-the Limit for an Effective
Federal Judiciary, 76 JUDICATURE 187 (December-January 1993); Stephen Reinhardt, Too
Few Judges, Too Many Cases, 79 A.B.A.J. (January 1993); Robert Stem, Remedies for
Appellate Overloads: the Ultimate Solution, 72 JUDICATURE 103 (August-September 1988);
Victor Williams, Solutions to Federal Judicial Gridlock 76 JUDICATURE 185
(December-January 1993).
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recommendations may have merit. At the same time, to the extent that delay
is attributable to causes other than workload, those other causes-and
recommendations to address them-likewise deserve attention.
b. Insufficient Numbers of Sitting Judges
The rate at which a judicial district's docket moves is a function not only of
the number of cases filed, but also of the number of judges available to hear
those cases. To the extent that delays result from a paucity of available judges,
such delays are beyond the control of the judiciary, and are thus defensible.
Shortfalls of judges may be attributable to an insufficiency of judgeships
authorized for a given judicial district. Congress has, over the past several
decades, periodically created additional judgeships to cope with the steady
increase in federal court caseload. 6 Delays caused by an unmet need for the
creation of additional judgeships, are thus cyclical, with problems being most
acute in the years immediately preceding legislative reform.7
Shortages of judicial man and woman power are also frequently attributable
to delays in the appointment of judges to fill existing vacancies. 8 As of October
1, 1993, for example, there were 107 district court vacancies, and only nine
nominees. 9
c. Structural Inefficiency
Some delays are attributable to inefficiencies inherent in the structure of the
civil and criminal justice systems. Among the more controversial barriers to
efficient adjudication are the procedural and jurisdictional impediments to
6 See Posner, supra note 5, at 353-57 (chronicling increases in size of the federal
judiciary).
71n 1990, Representative Jack Brooks, Chair of the House Judiciary Committee,
offered the following explanation in support of legislation culminating in the most
recent creation of additional district court judgeships: "[S]ome district courts...with a
large number of drug prosecutions have experienced a tremendous increase in their
caseloads. This increase in drug caseloads has also had the unfortunate effect of backing
up the civil docket in these districts as well. H.R. 5316 will provide much needed
assistance for courts overrun by criminal cases." 136 CONG. REc. H8282, H8284 (daily
ed. September 27,1990).
8"Creating new judgeships is just one part of the solutionto court overcrowding.
The other necessary component is decisive action by the President to fill vacancies
among existing judgeships. It is clear that neither this bill nor any other judgeship
proposal will do much to ease the courts' caseload burden unless the President acts
promptly to fill both the new positions and these current vacancies." 136 CoNG. REC.
H8282, H8284 (daily ed. September 27,1990).
9THE THIRD BRANCH, v. 25, No. 10 at 8 (October, 1993).
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comprehensive aggregation of related, mass-tort litigation,10 but there are
many others.11
Deciding whether to eliminate structural inefficiencies as a means to
alleviate delay can be a dicey business, since the benefits of alleviating delay
must be weighed against the cost of losing the benefits that the existing
structure was designed to yield. Thus, for example, the benefit of delays
avoided by legislation facilitating the aggregation of mass-tort litigation must
be weighed against the cost of losing individualized, case-by-case adjudication
under the current system.12 In any case, such inefficiencies are "defensible", as
I have defined the term, inasmuch as they are beyond the judges' control.
d. Case Complexity
A single, complicated piece of commercial litigation can all but monopolize
a judge's time for years.13 In addition, an infinite variety of complications such
1OFederal suits seeking damages against manufacturers, insurance carriers and
others for injuries allegedly caused by the Dalkan Shield intrauterine device, or exposure
to asbestos or Agent Orange, have collectively numbered in the hundreds of thousands.
Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 5, at 548. These cases have succeeded in clogging a
number of district courts, causing concomitant dispositional delay.
A wide range of suggestions have been offered to address the backlog and delay
created by mass-tort litigation. Such proposals have taken a variety of tacks, including:
modifying the rules of civil procedure relating to class actions, seeLinda Mullenix, Class
Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed Federal Procedure Act, 64 TEx. L. REV. 1039
(1986) or joinder, see Richard Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiff
Autonomy and the Court's Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. PITrL. REV. 809 (1989);
expanding diversity jurisdiction to accommodate related mass-tort actions while
enhancing the ability of the multidistrict litigation panel to consolidate such actions, see
Thomas D. Rowe & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty, Multiforum
Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 7 (1986); Charles Geyh, Complex Litigation Reform and the
Legislative Process, 10 REV. LITIG. 401 (1991); and creating specific federal question
jurisdiction, see H.R. 231, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)(creating federal question
jurisdiction over aviation accident litigation). See also Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note
5, at 552. What these approaches have in common is an interest in improving the
efficiency with which such litigation is handled as a means to alleviate delay.
11Indeed, any required process in excess of summary disposition is, in some sense,
a structural "inefficiency" that genera tes delay.
12 See, e.g., Robert Sedler and Aaron Twerski, The Case Against All Encompassing
Federal Mass-Tort Legislation: Without Gain, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 76 (1989).
13 The IBM and ATT antitrust cases represent two extreme examples. U.S. v. IBM, 618
F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1980). U.S. v. ATT, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd. summarily sub
nom. Maryland v. U.S., 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). See also Frederick M. Rowe, Antitrust in
Transition: A Policy in Search of Itself, 54 ANTITRUST L. J. 5 (1985); Stephen M. Axium,
AT&T and IBM: U.S. Actions Compute? The Settlement and Dismissal, N.Y.L.J. (1982); Alan
K. McAdams, A Bad Move for All Concerned (Dropping the Antitrust Case Against IBM),
L.A. DAILY J., May 17,1984, at 4. John Adams Wettergreen, AT&T and IBM: Reaping the
Fruit of Business Freedom, L.A. DAILY J., January 17,1983, at 4. STEVEN FLANDERS & JOHN
MCDERMOTr, OPERATION OFTHEFEDERAL JUDICIAL COUNCILS 32 (1978) (observing that in
a number of situations, a judge's entire docket had become backlogged by a single case).
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as scheduling conflicts, protracted settlement negotiations, and the need for
coordination with related litigation may legitimately delay otherwise
uncomplicated cases. As with caseload, delays caused by the complexity of the
case or other complications may be defended as the price to be paid for
reasonable and just decision-making, and are, in any event, beyond the judge's
control. Proposals to alleviate complexity-related delays often seek to do so
indirectly by such measures as abolition of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction
(thereby removing from the federal system much of the complex, time
consuming, commercial litigation) or elimination of the structural barriers that
impede efficient aggregation of related litigation, as discussed above.
2. Indefensible Delay
Of greater concern to the Civil Justice Reform Act, and hence to this article,
is indefensible delay, which, like defensible delay, has a number of causes.
a. Nonstructural Inefficiency
Delays attributable to a judge's own inefficiency may fairly be characterized
as indefensible. While abject incompetence is rare, less than efficient case
management is not. Indeed, the stated catalyst for the Brookings Institution
Task Force report prompting introduction and passage of the Civil Justice
Reform Act was that "(i)ncreasingly, all who participate in the judicial
system-litigants, judges, and attorneys-are voicing complaints about its
fairness and efficiency. In many courts, litigants must wait for years to resolve
their disputes."14
A 1989 Harris poll commissioned by the Foundation for Change, suggested
a link between delay and inefficient case management by judges:
The prevalent view is that the judge most controls the pace of litigation.
About 3 out of 4 corporate counsel, 7 out of 10 public interest litigators,
the majority of plaintiff's litigators and a near majority of defense
litigators feel that judges are not forceful enough in their case
management.
15
A chief circuit judge made a related point in a recent interview with Thomas
Willging and Jeffrey Barr, noting that "delays in discovery will delay the whole
case."16 The primary effect of insufficiently organized and aggressive case
1 4 REPORT OF A TASK FORCE OF THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, AND JUSTICE FOR ALL 1(1989)[hereinafter AND JUSTICE FOR ALL].
15The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the Judicial Improvenwnts Act of 1990: Hearings
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (March 6 and June 26, 1990)
(Study of Louis Harris and Associates, conducted for the Foundation for Change).
16Barr, counsel to the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, and
Willging, a researcher with the Federal Judicial Center, collaborated in conducting
interviews of several present and former chief circuit judges in the fall of 1992. They
were gracious enough to furnish me with a partial transcription of their interviews,
which I quote at various points in this article. Because the transcription is unpaginated,
1993]
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
management, concluded the Brookings Report, was that lawyers were enabled
to abuse the discovery process, and thereby protract litigation and increase the
attendant expense of adjudicating disputes in the federal courts. 17
b. Belligerence
Delay can be motivated by spite. The judge may be disenchanted with the
litigants or their lawyers, or frustrated by a burdensome statutory directive or
annoyed by an order from an appellate court. And so the judge does nothing.
While there is little evidence to suggest that belligerent delay is commonplace,
there is evidence that it occurs. In Hall v. West, for example, the Fifth Circuit
lost patience with a district judge who had delayed issuing school
desegregation orders, observing that the district court's failure to act showed:
startling, if not shocking, lack of appreciation of the clear
pronouncements of the Supreme Court and this Court .... His failure
to respect these admonishments makes it reasonably clear that an order
from us directing merely that he enter a judgment in the cases would
mean simply that the case would be back here again .... 18
c. Indecisiveness
Delays related to indecisiveness are not uncommon. To some extent, such
delays are defensible. After all, deliberation is to be encouraged, and a hasty
decision by an uncertain judge, made in the name of clearing her dockets, is
obviously undesirable. On the other hand, the attributes that make for an
outstanding lawyer as advocate are not necessarily the same qualities that
make for an outstanding lawyer as judge. Occasionally, a lawyer will ascend
the bench who finds the transition from advocacy to adjudication especially
difficult. The net effect may be a judge so worried about her legacy or making
a mistake that she becomes all but paralyzed by indecision.
Several chief circuit judges spoke of indecision-related delays in their
interviews with Barr and Willging: One interviewee described a judge "who
was all backed up" with "stacks of cases."19 The interviewer went on to explain
that "the judge hesitated sending the opinions out, he was afraid he was
wrong."20 Said another chief judge: "This is a great problem in administering
and preserves the anonymity of the judges interviewed, I am unable to identify the
speaker or to report where in the transcript the statement was made when I quote a
given judge. You will just have to trust me. Segments of Barr & Willging's interviews
are reproduced in a report they submitted to the National Commission on Judicial
Discipline and Removal. See, JEFFREY BARR & THOMAS WILLGING, ADMIMSTRATION OF
THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF 1980 (1993).
17AND JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 14, at 67.
18335 F.2d 481, 484-85 (5th Cir. 1964).
19 See BARR & WILLGING, supra note 16.
201d.
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the judiciary, delay. Not because those judges are lazy-often they work real
hard-but because they have a perfectionist thing about letting go of cases."21
A third chief circuit judge added that, "with delay, sometimes a judge just has
trouble making up his mind."22
d. Disability
Delay is frequently a byproduct of infirmity. Judges who become sick or
senile may have an understandably difficult time keeping abreast of their
dockets.23 Often times, decision-making delays constitute the first significant
outward manifestation of disability. In describing a fairly typical episode, a
chief circuit judge stated the following: "Once, a senior member of the bar, who
I knew personally, complained informally about an elderly judge who had not
acted on a matter two years under advisement. I took the judge to lunch several
times and tried to get him to recognize these problems, but he wouldn't. Finally,
I refused to certify him as a senior judge."24
e. Sloth and Neglect
The judiciary has always had to cope with what Professor Fish has referred
to as "the perennial problems associated with lazy... judges."25 Rarely can
delays be attributed to unalloyed neglect or lethargy.26 More often, this
conclusion must be arrived at by a process of elimination: if the judge's cases
are neither too numerous nor complex, and delays can not be ascribed to
21id.
22 Id.
23 professor Peter Fish reports on the efforts of one chief judge to coax the aged District
Judge Mel Underwood, who "just was not doing much work," into retirement. PETER
FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 412, 416 (1973). Similarly, one
chief circuit judge, answering a questionnaire disseminated to past and present chief
circuit judges by Professor Richard Marcus and me in our capacity as consultants to the
National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, reported two instances in
which a judge's poor health resulted in delays. CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, MEANS OF
JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE OrHER THAN THOSE PRESCRIBED BY THE JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE STATUTE,
28 U.S.C. § 372(c), at app. A, question 6 (1993)[hereinafter "GEYH REPORT"].
24 See BARR & WILLCING, supra note 16.
25FISH, supra note 23, at 87.
26 Professor Fish reported a 1936 episode, in which "all the judges of one district court
in the Eighth Circuit threatened to leave for summer vacations simultaneously, thereby
closing the court," a move prompting a rebuke from the Chief Justice and a consequent
change in vacation plans on the part of the judges. Id. at 89-90. He also described Chief
Justice Taft's reaction to a district judge, whose "failure to clear his docket or resign
provoked the Chief Justice to threaten an ultimatum to him for 'his refusal to do any
team work or to be interested in his work."' Id. at 88.
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structural or non-structural inefficiency, belligerence or disability, the
inescapable conclusion may be that the judge is not working hard enough.27
B. Mechanisms for Addressing Indefensible Delays, and Their Effectiveness
A variety of mechanisms are in place to alleviate indefensible
decision-making delay, ranging from the very formal to the completely
informal. It is interesting to note, that on average, the less formal mechanisms
are by far the more effective.
1. Formal Mechanisms
a. The Judicial Conduct and Disability Act
The Judicial Conduct and Disability Act provides an administrative
mechanism within each of the circuits to process and act upon complaints of
judicial misconduct and disability. The Act permits any person to file a written
complaint, alleging that a district, bankruptcy or magistrate judge has
"engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration
of the business of the courts," or is "unable to discharge all the duties of office
by reason of mental or physical disability."28 Complaints so filed are reviewed
by the chief circuit judge, who may dismiss those that are frivolous,
merits-related or that otherwise allege conduct not prejudicial to judicial
administration. 29 Proceedings not dismissible may nevertheless be
"concluded," where appropriate remedial action has been taken.30
Matters neither dismissed nor concluded are referred to special investigative
committees comprised of circuit and district judges, who in turn make
recommendations to the circuit judicial council.31 The council is authorized to
take "such action as is appropriate," short of removing the judge from office.32
Enumerated remedial options include reprimanding a judge privately or
publicly, requesting that a judge voluntarily retire, certifying a judge as
disabled, temporarilysuspending a judge's caseload, or referring a matter to
the Judicial Conference of the United States for further action.33
A straightforward reading of the Act would certainly seem to bring delay
within its scope. Excessive, unjustified delay is, by definition, prejudicial to the
"expeditious" administration of the courts' business. And it is hard to see how
nonfrivolous complaints of delay could be dismissed as related to the merits
2 7 See, e.g., FISH, supra note 23, at 87.
2828 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1)(1993).
2928 U.S.C. § 372(c)(2)-(3)(1993).
3 0 d.
3128 U.S.C. § 372(c)(4)(A)(1993).
3228 U.S.C. § 372(c)(6)(1993).
3 31d.
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of the judge's decision, inasmuch as the conduct complained of is the complete
absence of a decision, without regard to what the merits of such a decision may
ultimately be.34
Moreover, complaints under the Act alleging unjustified decision-making
delay are not uncommon. The Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, for example, reports that in 1991, 359 complaints were filed, of which
54 alleged undue decisional delay or judicial neglect/incompetence. 35
Despite the relative frequency of such complaints, and the apparent
applicability of the Act, the Act has not proved to be an especially potent
weapon in combatting delay. First, and perhaps foremost, conscientious
lawyers who are in the best position to call legitimate problems of delay to the
attention of the chief circuit judge are reluctant to do so. Asked if he would
consider filing a complaint under the Act, in response to an episode of excessive
delay, Alan Morrison, head of the Public Citizen Litigation Group, offered the
following answer to the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and
Removal:
No. I guess I never thought of actually using it at all .... [I]f I'm
reluctant to file mandamus petitions... this would be even more of a
problem for me because it suggests something ought to happen to the
judge. And as a regular litigator in the federal courts, it's hard enoup
to file a mandamus petition. But this would be awfully difficult to do.
The net effect is that many of the delay complaints that are filed are frivolous.
Even to the extent that competent, well-intentioned complaints are filed,
they have received a chilly reception from chief circuit judges. The Illustrative
Rules Governing Complaints of Judicial Misconduct and Disability, developed by a
Special Committee of the Conference of Chief Judges, interpret the Act to
exclude complaints of decisional delay in individual cases.37 The questionnaire
completed by present and former chief circuit judges reflects a similar
sentiment. Of 25 judges expressing a view, only five stated that they do not
ordinarily dismiss complaints of isolated decisional delay.38 An additional four
recognized complaints of habitual delay only, while the remaining 16 routinely
dismissed complaints of delay for any of the following reasons: delay was not
deemed prejudicial administration; it was related to the merits of a judicial
ruling (insofar as complainants can file mandamus petitions challenging
34Apparent illogic notwithstanding, delay complaints are frequently dismissed as
merits-related. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
3 5 THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS 117 (1992).
36 Hearings of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal 133 (1992)
(Statement of Alan Morrison, Esq.)
3 7 ILLusTRATIVE RULES GOVERNING COMPLAINTS OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT AND
DISABILITY, Rule l(e) (1986).
38GEYH REPORT, supra note 23, at app. A, question 12.
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decisional delays in the appellate courts); or it is simply an ineffective means
for remedying delay.39 In short, the disciplinary process has proven to be a
disappointing vehicle for addressing decision-making delay.
b. Circuit Judicial Council Orders
Each circuit has a judicial council, comprised of circuit and district judges,
which serves as the administrative and disciplinary head of the circuit. The
council is authorized, among other things, to "make all necessary and
appropriate orders for the effective and expeditious administration of justice
within its circuit."40
Prior to 1980, each council was permitted, under its general ordermaking
authority, to issue all orders necessary "for the effective and expeditious
administration of justice within its circuit"-language identical to the standard
established for imposing discipline under the Judicial Conduct and Disability
Act. It is at least paradoxical, if not hopelessly baffling, to find that when this
language appears in the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, it has been read
to exclude decisional delay, while when it appears in the judicial council
ordermaking statute, it has been read to reach it.41 From the councils' inception,
their general order-making authority has been used to address decisional delay
by calling judges to task for delays, suspending their caseloads, or reshuffling
their dockets.42 In the 1970s, Flanders & McDermott reported "several instances
in which a council took action when a judge's docket became backlogged."43
And in the 1992 survey of chief circuit judges, several indicated that judicial
council orders had been employed to alleviate decision-making delay.44
Notwithstanding that the judicial councils have occasionally used their
order-making authority to attack delay, it is a power that has been exercised
only infrequently. The councils have long been criticized as "rusty hinges" of
judicial administration.4 5
Explanations for council inertia are many. For instance, council action may
be perceived as a threat to judicial independence.46 Furthermore, the enabling
391d.
4028 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1) (1993).
4128 U.S.C. § 3329d)(1) (1993).
42 FISH, supra note 23 at 401.
43 FLANDERS & MCDERMOTT, supra note 13, at 32.
44GEYH REPORT, supra note 23, at app. A, question 6.
45 Peter Fish, The Judicial Councils: Rusty Hinges of Federal Judicial Administration, 37
U. CHI. L. REV. 203 (1970).
46In Re Imperial "400" National, Inc., 481 F.2d 41 (3rd Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom.
Union Bank of Los Angeles v. Nolan, 414 U.S. 880 (1973).
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statute may offer insufficient guidance as to the scope of council authority.47
As one commentator explained, councils are reluctant to "crack the whip" over
their colleagues48 and prefer informal persuasion to formal orders.49 Whatever
the explanation, chief circuit judges, when asked to assess the effectiveness of
six mechanisms for remedying judicial neglect and delay ranked judicial
council orders last, with only five of 19 judges characterizing it as an effective
means of remedying delay.50
c. Mandamus
Mandamus is the most conventional mechanism available to remedy
excessive, decision-making delay, and there are many published cases in which
courts of appeals have granted or threatened to grant5' mandamus relief to end
excessive delays. 52 It nevertheless remains a problematic device for combatting
delay. First, lawyers are reluctant to file mandamus petitions for the same
reason that they are reluctant to file disciplinary complaints against individual
judges: they fear alienating the judge. As Alan Morrison explained to the
National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal:
The case is sitting there not for days or weeks but for months, and in
some cases years. For the lawyer [there are] nothing but bad choices
... [In the end, there's nothing you can do save file a petition for writ
of mandamus. And then what does that do? It may get you a decision,
but not the one that you and your client want.
53
Second, mandamus standards are exacting and extremely difficult to satisfy.
Courts have referred to mandamus as a "drastic remedy,"54 "reserved for really
4 7See Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 85 n.6 (1970)
(standing for the proposition that 28 U.S.C. § 332 is "not a model of clarity in terms of
the scope of the judicial council's powers.")
48 FISH, supra note 23, at 406-07.
491d. at 413.
50GEYH REPORT, supra note 23, at app. A, question 13.
5 11t is not uncommon for a court to decline to issue a mandamus order despite its
conclusion that grounds for mandamus exist. The reasoning for this conclusion is that
the district judge is likely to end the delay without the need for a formal order. In
describing the process to Barr and Willging, one chief judge stated: "You issue the usual
order, say mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, you are confident the judge will take
care of the matter in the immediate future. Invariably, the judge will take care of that
case." BARR & WILLGING, supra note 16.
52 See, e.g., In reFunkhouser, 873 F.2d 1076 (8th Cir. 1989); Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278
(8th Cir. 1978); McClellan V. Young, 421 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1970); Hall v. West, 335 F.2d
481 (5th Cir. 1964).
5 3 HEARINGS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DIscPLINE AND REMOVAL 123
(1992). (statement of Alan Morrison, Esq.)
54 Kerr v. United States, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976).
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extraordinary cases,"55 "amounting to a judicial 'usurpation of power.'"56 These
characteristics convey the sense of the stringency of mandamus requirements.
As a result of these stringent standards, legitimate complaints of delay pursued
under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act and in mandamus proceedings
may be rejected in both. One chief judge described the process as follows:
[C]omplaints occasionally raised delay, which I found difficult. In an
individual case, the rules are clear it's no go, you file mandamus, even
though the number of mandamuses granted is so minuscule you're not
sure how practical an alternative that is.
57
2. Informal Mechanisms
a. Peer Pressure
Judges are no less susceptible to the influence of their colleagues than anyone
else. As Judge Irving Kaufman wrote, "[p]eer pressure is a potent tool. It should
not be underestimated because it is neither exposed to public view nor
enshrined in law."58 As Kaufman explains, "[a] judge who falls significantly
behind in his work is coaxed--and usually effectively-to keep up. If he is not
incompetent but merely exhausted, not lazy but simply overworked, a brief
respite can be arranged by his colleagues and may prove sufficient."59 To the
extent that delay is a manifestation of a more permanent problem, peer pressure
is a useful means to encourage retirement. In Kaufman's words:
[o]n occasion, close colleagues of an afflicted judge suggest that he
retire. If necessary, other judges, attorneys, and even family members
may approach the ailing jurist. A lmost invariably he will acquiesce....
Distasteful it is, but highly effective. Few judges would long withstand
the importunings of their peers. Even if the judge is slow to accept the
suggestion of his brethren, this method is sure to accomplish his ouster
faster than a formal procedure.
60
An obvious limitation on peer pressure as a remedy for indefensible delay
is its dependence for success upon uncontrollable variables: the collegiality of
the given court, the responsiveness of the target judges, and the public
spiritedness of their colleagues. 61 Not surprisingly, then, while 15 of 24 chief
5SEx Parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947).
56Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967).
5 7See BARR & WILLGING, supra note 16.
58Irving Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L. J. 681, 709 (1979).
591d. at 708.
601d. at 709.
6 1
"The effectiveness of informal peer pressure in ridding the judiciary of disabled
members is based substantially on the prevalence within the judiciary of an atmosphere
of good faith and collegiality." Id. at 711. One chief circuit judge echoed these sentiments
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judges responding to the questionnaire described peer pressure as a "somewhat
effective" measure for remedying judicial neglect and delay, only 3 went so far
as to describe it as "very effective," while one divided his answer between
"somewhat and very effective," and the remaining 5 considered it "somewhat
ineffective or ineffective."62
b. Informal Chief Circuit Judge Communication
Perhaps the single most frequently used means for coping with indefensible
decision-making delay is communication from the chief circuit judge. As one
chief circuit judge stated, "[i]nformal processes sornetime[s] take a while, but
work better. You could never get the judicial council to go in one direction to
solve such a problem unless the Chief Judge had already done all he could
informally."63 In the words of another judge:
My primary attention was on delay in the decisional process... One
judge had seven motions delayed over a year. I called him up. Delays
in discovery will delay the whole case. So most of my action was
informal talking to judges. It was very successful; the seven cases were
disposed of in two weeks.
64
A third judge expressed a similar view stating: "I would never identify a 372(c)
complaint to handle delay. If a formal complaint is filed, then you have to
handle it, but otherwise I'd keep delay informal."65 "With delay," commented
a fourth judge, "sometimes a judge just has trouble making up his mind. Often
talking to the judge informally helps."
A related strategy is for the chief circuit judge to consult with the chief district
judge, who can bring additional pressure to bear:
In one situation, a judge was not doing any work, was light years
behind. My style was to call the Chief Judge of the district court and
tell him this had been a building problem, it's time to act. The Chief
Judge brought it up with the rest of the district court, which solved its
own problem by reassigning the jud e's cases. I never took it to the
judicial council, that's self-defeating.
in an interview with Barr and Willging: "If it's a collegial court, you look for the most
humane solution. If it's not a collegial court, I don't know what you do. If you have a
court that's ideologically divided, then... the other judges in the elderly senior judge's
voting bloc may want to prop him up on the bench." BARR & WILLGING, supra note 16.
62 GEYH REPORT, supra note 23, at app. A, question 13.
63See BARR & WILLGING, supra note 16.
64Id.
65Id.
66Id.
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Chief circuit judges responding to the survey indicated a cumulative total of
85 to 92 disciplinary actions taken in response to evidence of misconduct or
disability informally received between 1980 and 1992. In 77 to 80 of those
instances, such actions included or were limited to informal communications
from the chief circuit judge. The most frequently identified problem was
decision-making delay.67 Consistent with this finding is that 15 or 16 of 28 chief
circuit judges considered informal actions by them or chief district judges to be
very effective in remedying judicial neglect and delay, while an additional 10
or 11 characterized it as somewhat effective.68
The one significant problem with informal communications from the chief
circuit judge is that target judges are free to ignore them-an infrequent, but
recurrent phenomenon. Fish vividly describes an episode involving District
Judge Mell Underwood:
He "just was not doing much work," and the chief.., judge reported,
"a number of mandamus cases were filed against him in our court."
When presented with the unanimous council resolution urging him to
retire from the bench, Underwood allegedly retorted that "they have
no authority to remove me, and they've found that out. I told them to
go to hell."6
While the Underwood affair occurred in the 1960s, the issue remains alive and
well, as evidenced by the following remarks by a circuit judge to Barr and
Willging: "You're dealing with judges who don't have to do anything except
withstand impeachment. If you tell a judge to do something and the judge says
go to hell, how do you enforce it?"70 One chief circuit judge expressed a similar
concern during his interview with Barr and Willging:
The biggest problem was on my own court. There was no difficulty in
talking to district judges about a problem. But on the appeals court,
one or two judges didn't get their work out. Every circuit has judges
like that. If you mention it, your peers resent that, it's very sensitive,
they're recalcitrant to do anything about it.
71
Added another chief circuit judge, in a related vein:
This is a great problem in administering the judiciary, delay... You
can talk to them until you're blue in the face, it doesn't help.
Occasionally talking helps, but not for the really chronic ones. So, with
67BARR & WILLGING, supra note 16, at app. A, question 6.
681d. at app. C, question 13.
69 FISH, supra note 23, at 412.
7OSee BARR & WILLcING, supra note 16.
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the consent of the court, you say take a year off and catch up. Some of
these judges keep volunteering for things and nothing gets done.72
c. Publicity and Public Accountability
Chief circuit judges thwarted in their efforts to resolve disciplinary problems
informally by target judges unwilling to take such informal overtures seriously
have long recognized the value of publicity and going to the press. Fish,
discussing the informal coercive mechanisms available to the judicial councils,
as contemplated by the Framers of the Administrative Office Act of 1939,
writes:
Publicity within the legal guild offered another acceptable technique.
"Just turning the light of day on the judges probably in most instances
would be all that is required." Peer group ostracism would do the rest.
So thought Arthur Vanderbilt, who told the Senate Judiciary
Committee that "no judge likes to have the fact that he is not abreast
of his work held up to public notice."
73
Judge Underwood, who at last report had responded to his Judicial Council's
call for his retirement by suggesting that its members visit the underworld,74
ultimately capitulated when the matter was publicized. As the chief circuit
judge involved described the situation:
We kept after him, and the largest newspaper in Ohio with statewide
circulation published some accounts concerning the way he was
handling his work, and he finally called me up and said his name had
been 'dragged down in the mud far enough,' and that he would retire,
and he did retire.h
Judge Kaufman points out that rarely will a judge disregard the importunings
of his colleagues as cavalierly as did Underwood, precisely because of the risk
that the episode would be publicized. "[O]pen activism is rarely necessary,"
explains Kaufman. "Few judges are willing to risk public attention by
persistently rejecting their colleagues' overtures."76
Chief circuit judges underscored the significance of adverse publicity in their
interviews with Barr and Willging. As one judge stated, "the threat of
newspaper coverage is a big deterrent. Every judge worries about something
coming out in the newspaper." Another chief judge reported informally
securing a miscreant judge's promise to reform in exchange for the chiefjudge's
promise "not to publicize the matter." And in the questionnaire completed by
721d.
731d. at 52.
74 d.
75FISH, supra note 23, at 416 (quoting Judge Paul Weick).
7 6Kaufman, supra note 58, at 709.
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chief circuit judges, one specifically listed "newspaper articles" as a very
significant deterrent to judicial misconduct.77
It is this concern over adverse publicity, that § 476 seeks to exploit by
publishing data disclosing which judges are behind in their work, and to what
extent. At this juncture, it may be useful to turn to a discussion of § 476, its
development and implementation.
Ill. DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF § 476
A. Development
The idea for § 476 originated in 1988 and 1989, with a task force on civil justice
reform convened by the Brookings Institution, at the suggestion of Senator
Joseph Biden, Jr., Chair of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.78 A task force
cosponsor, the Foundation for Change, commissioned Lou Harris and
Associates to poll judges, lawyers and litigants on matters related to the task
force's work. Harris's findings included that:
A majority of all groups-including federal judges -favor increasing
judicial accountability by requiring each court to make publicly
available each year the average length of cases, weighted by type of
case, under each federal judge. Further, a majority favor a requirement
that judges make publicly available in the courthouse all civil cases
which have been pending for a year or more ....79
The task force report, published in 1989, recommended first and foremost,
that all federal district courts be directed by statute to develop and implement
a "Civil Justice Reform Plan."80 Included in such a plan, added the task force,
should be a provision for "the regular publication of pending undecided
motions and caseload progress."8 1 Specifically, the task force recommended
that the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts be directed to publish
quarterly reports listing the motions pending before each judge for over 30,60,
and 90 days, and all succeeding 30-day increments. It further recommended
that the courts "report data for each judge indicating the aging of his or her
77 GEYH REPORT, supra note 23, at app. A, question 2.
78Federal Courts Study Comm. Implementation Act, and Civil Justice Reform Act: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Admin. of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 293 (Sept. 6, 1990) [hereinafter House
Hearings] (House Judiciary Comm. Report on the Civil Justice Reform Act).
79 The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990: Hearings
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 91,159
(March 6 and June 26,1990) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (Procedural Reform and the Civil
Justice System, a Study Conducted for the Foundation for Change, Inc.).
80 Id. at 438.
811d. at 453.
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caseload."82 The task force concluded: "We believe that substantially
expanding the availability of public information about caseloads by judge will
encourage judges with significant backlogs in undecided motions and cases to
resolve those matters and to move their cases along more quickly."83
In January, 1990, Senator Biden introduced S. 2027, implementing task force
recommendations. 84 Included in the bill were new sections 471(b)(13) and
475(b)(1) to title 28, which implemented, essentially verbatim, those
recommendations relating to publication of case and motion delays. Section
471(b)(13) provided for the development of Civil Justice Expense and Delay
Reduction plans, which were to include, among other things, "[p]rocedures for
the regular publication of pending undecided motions and caseload progress.
for each individual judge to enhance judicial accountability."85 Section
475(b)(1), in turn, provided for improved automation, so as to:
make available to the public a quarterly report listing all pending
submitted motions before each judge that are unresolved for more than
30,60, and 90 days, and all succeeding 30-day increments. Such report
shall include data for each judge of the district indicating the aging of
his or her caseload in each of the tracking categories developed by the
district under its civil justice expense and delay reduction plan .... 86
Reaction to the "Biden bill" from the federal bench was swift and negative.
Central to the judiciary's objections was the perception that the expense and
delay reduction plans called for in the legislation interfered unjustifiably with
district judges' case management prerogatives.8 7 In response, Senate staff met
with a special task force of the Judicial Conference over the course of the
succeeding five months in an effort to resolve their differences. 88
The result was S. 2648, introduced in May, 1990. It reflected a number of
significant changes from S. 2027, including more relaxed provisions relating to
publication of case delay information. What was now § 473(a)(7) provided for
"enhancement of the accountability of each judicial officer" through the
publication of semiannual, rather than quarterly reports, disclosing the number
of motions pending over six months, rather than 30 days, together with the
8 21d.
831d.
84 S. 2027, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
85136 CONG. REc. S414 (daily ed. January 25, 1990).
86S. 2027, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1990).
8 7See, Senate Hearings, supra note 79. "IT]here has been a strong reaction that the bill
is extraordinarily intrusive into the internal workings of the Judicial Branch.... Many
thoughtful federal judges are very, very uneasy about the signals this bill sends of
legislative incursion-albeit well-meaning-in the judicial arena and what it portends
for the future." Id. at 221 (statement of Judge Aubrey Robinson).
881d. at 309-10.
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number of bench trials submitted more than six months "and the number of
cases that have not been terminated within three years of filing."89
Notwithstanding the changes reflected in S. 2648, the bill continued to
require each district court to develop expense and delay reduction plans
including certain mandatory components, and the Judicial Conference
continued to oppose the bill on essentially the same grounds as it opposed
S. 2027.90 With respect to § 473(a)(7), its concern was twofold: 1) that the
"artificial deadlines" created by the reporting system can have "untoward
effects" on "the quality of judicial work and on the morale of the
conscientious;" 91 and 2) that motions, bench trials and cases may be delayed
for good reasons, or reasons beyond the judge's control, and that simply
reporting the raw number of motions, trials and cases delayed could thus be
misleading.92
It was now the House of Representatives' turn. At Senator Biden's request,
House Judiciary Committee Chairman Jack Brooks introduced a companion
bill identical to S. 2027 in January, 1990 (H.R. 3898). Hearings on the bill were
held in September, 1990.93 The resulting version of H.R. 3898, approved by the
House Judiciary Committee, included one change of overriding significance:
the contents of the expense and delay reduction plans were made wholly
discretionary with the district courts, thereby overcoming the Judicial
Conference's primary objection to the Biden bill.94
Other changes were made as well, including the addition of a new section
476-the case and motion delay publication provision ultimately enacted into
law. Section 476 included three changes from S. 2648's § 473(a)(7): 1) to
89S. 2648, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. § 473(a)(7) (1990).
90Senate Hearings, supra note 79, at 348 (testimony of Judge Robert Peckham) ('The
legislation would represent unwise legislative intrusion into procedural matters that
are properly the province of the judiciary," and "[tihe mandatory nature and the rigidity
of some of the provisions of the bill would impair judges' ability to manage the dockets
most effectively .... ").
911d. at 340 (testimony of the Honorable Robert Peckham).
92 House Hearings, supra note 78.
931d.
941d. at 287. Unlike S. 2648, which had provided that "[a] civil justice expense and
delay reduction plan developed and implemented under this chapter shall include
provisions applying the following principles and guidelines. .. " (Senate Hearings, supra
note 79, at 554), H.R. 3898, as marked up by the House Judiciary Committee, provided
that "[a] civil justice expense and delay reduction plan developed and implemented
under this chapter may include provisions applying the following principles and
guidelines .... H.R. 3898, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 473 (1990). As the House Committee
explained: 'The Committee has considered and rejected making inclusion of these
criteria mandatory. Such an approach is objectionable to the judicial branch, and the
Committee is unwilling to impose the Congress' view of proper case management upon
an unwilling judiciary." House Hearings, supra note 78, at 297-98 (Judiciary Committee
Report).
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preserve the mandatory character of the provision, it was made a freestanding
requirement, independent of the expense and delay reduction plan (the
contents of which were now completely discretionary with the district
courts);95 2) at the suggestion of Alan Morrison, Director of the Public Citizen
Litigation Group, the provision was revised to require the names of the cases,
bench trials and motions delayed-not just their total number;96 and 3)
characterization of the provision as designed to enhance judicial
"accountability" was deleted at the urging of the Judicial Conference, which
found the reference insulting.97
The Judicial Conference initially raised the same objections to H.R. 3898 §476
that it had raised to S. 2648 § 473(a)(7), and emphasized that lists of pending
motions, trials and cases, unaccompanied by further explanation, "would be
quite unfair and misleading," given that there could be any number of
legitimate reasons for the delays.98 The House Committee Report responded
to those objections by noting that "nothing in this section should prohibit or
discourage the inclusion of an explanation for why a particular matter has
properly remained on the docket for a longer than usual period of time."99
Ultimately, the Judicial Conference withdrew its objections after the legislation,
as passed by the House, revised by the Senate, and reapproved by the House
9 5House Hearings, supra note 78, at 288.
9 6Senate Hearings, supra note 79, at 474, 475-76 (letter from Alan Morrison to Jeffrey
Peck, June 13, 1990):
[w]e believe that the requirement should be expanded to include a
listing of each case falling within each category... There are two
principle reasons why it is important that more than numbers be
submitted. First, there is no way for outsiders to determine whether
the numbers are accurate unless the cases are listed.... Second, some
cases may be extraordinarily complicated and others may be simple, yet
the delays may be the same .... [1]n order to make some possible assess-
ment of the justification, or lack thereof, for particular delays, the names
of the cases must be made available.
Id.
The House Committee report adopted Morrison's explanation in making the
change: "By identifying the names of the cases, the public can better assess whether the
time frame associated with deciding the motion, adjudicating the trial or disposing of
the cases was reasonable. House Hearings, supra note 78, at 302.
9 7House Hearings, supra note 78, at 133 (testimony of the Honorable Robert Peckham):
By entitling this section '[e]nhancement of judicial accountability through
information dissemination' the drafters of this legislation imply that there
is a shortfall in judicial accountability and that it is sufficiently significant
to warrant being highlighted and addressed in a federal statute. We would
badly disserve the hundreds of federal judicial officers who work extra-
ordinarily long hours in order to provide the highest quality judicial services
if we failed to record how hurtful these implications have been.
Id.
98 House Hearings, supra note 78, at 134-35 (testimony of Robert Peckham).
991d. at 302.
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retained the non-binding character of the expense and delay reduction plan
contents. 100
B. Implementation
1. Preliminary Results
There is evidence to indicate that § 476 is having the desired effect.
Numerous reports were published by the legal press in the wake of the first
semiannual report, issued for the period ending September 30, 1991. Such
reports frequently listed judges and the number of delayed motions, trials and
cases corresponding to each, and identified the judges with the most serious
delays in the district.101 Several newspapers published followup articles
reporting the results of the second semiannual report, issued for the period
ending March 31, 1992, and comparing the delays listed in the first reports to
those in the second, in an effort to track the progress of judges within the
papers' districts.102 A number of those articles attributed particular delays to
100136 CONG. REC. H8263 (daily ed. September 27, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Kastenmeier) In its final form, the legislation called for all judicial districts to develop
expense and delay reduction plans, with no specific requirements as to content. In
addition, however, the Act called for a pilot program, in which ten participating districts
would develop plans in conformity with specified principles and guidelines that were
merely suggested for other districts. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-650,
§ 105; 28 U.S.C. § 473 (Supp. 1993).
101Robert Elder, Jr., Congress Catches Heat For Federal Court Woes; Texas Districts Want
More Money, Less Meddling, TEX. LAW., Jan. 27,1992, at 4; Andrew Holding, Burns Leads
State's Federal Bench in Overdue Motions; Rulings Awaited in 44 Cases For More Than Six
Months, THE CONN. L. TRIB., Dec. 23, 1991/Dec. 30, 1991, at 2; Gordon Hunter, Judges
Clog Federal Docket; Bench Trial Rulings, Pending Motions Pile Up In Texas Courts, TEX.
LAW., Nov. 18, 1991, at 1; Judge Penn's Backlog, THE WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1992, at A22;
Howard Mintz, Federal Judges Report Few Calendar Delays; Only 4 of 19 Report Matters
Pending Past 6 Months, THE RECORDER, Nov. 15, 1991, at 1; Howard Mintz, Few Tardy
Motions, District Judges Report, THE RECORDER, June 30,1992, at 2; Howard Mintz, Jensen
and Patel Have Largest Civil Backlogs; Report Lists Federal Cases Pending More Than 3 Years,
THE RECORDER, Dec. 20, 1991, at 1; Howard Mintz, Northern District Judges Trim Backlog
of Old Cases, THE RECORDER, July 28, 1992; Allyson L. Moore, U.S. Court Still Crowded
After All These Years, N.J.L.J., Apr. 25, 1991, at 1; Allyson L. Moore, U.S. Judges in N.J.
Moving Cases on Time, N.J.L.J., Dec. 5,1991, at 1; Gary Sturgess, Two Tardy Judges Are Late
Yet Again, LEGAL TIMEs, Dec. 2, 1991, at 7; Saundra Torry, Judge Designated D.C. Federal
Courts Chief Has Backlog of 70 Cases, THE WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1992, at B1.
102 Gordon Hunter, The Slowpoke Report: Part II; As of September 30, 1991, TEX. LAW.,
January 27, 1992 (following up on Texas Judges Clog Federal Docket, November 18, 1991,
at 1, listing the number of motions and bench trial rulings pending in each Texas judge's
court longer than six months; also lists the number of civil cases pending longer than
three years); Howard Mintz, Few Tardy Motions, District Judges Report, THE RECORDER,
June 30, 1992 (concluding that the act is having some effect, based on a comparison of
the first and second reports); Howard Mintz, Northern District Judges Trim Backlog of Old
Cases, THE RECORDER, July 28, 1992 (examining the backlogs of the 19 active and senior
judges in the Northern District of California, who reported 350 cases pending for more
than 3 years as of March 31, compared with 398 cases in September 1991; discussing
results of particular judges);John Flynn Rooney, Two Top Court's Motions Pending Report,
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causes outside the judge's control, suggesting a certain level of sensitivity for
the Judicial Conference's concern that the numbers themselves tell only part of
the story.103
The Administrative Office of the United States Courts reported that between
the first and second semiannual reports, the number of motions pending over
six months declined by 7%;104 the number of bench trials submitted for more
than six months declined by 3%;105 and the number of cases over three years
old declined by 5%.106 Between the second and third semiannual reports,
motions pending more than six months increased by 7%,107 while bench trials
submitted over six months declined by an additional 22% and cases over three
years dropped by another 7%.108
Chief circuit judges appear to be genuinely enthusiastic about the potential
for § 476 to reduce unjustified delay. Nineteen of twenty chief judges
expressing an opinion characterized § 476 as a "very effective" or "somewhat
effective" measure for remedying judicial neglect and unjustified delays.109 As
compared to five other mechanisms for alleviating unjustified delay, including
discipline under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, orders of the circuit
judicial councils, informal chief circuit judge action, mandamus, and peer
pressure, § 476 was regarded as the most effective, on average. 110
CHICAGO DAILY LAW BULLETIN, March 1, 1993, at 1 (comparing the results of local
Chicago area judges. Although there is some indication that the backlog became worse,
this is attributed to outside factors); Bruce Vielmetti, U.S. Courts Slow But Needn't Be,
Report Suggests, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, February 15, 1993, at 8 (comparing reports in
Tampa Bay area, and concluding that while judges carry a caseload greater than
average, the reports are encouraging).
103Howard Mintz, Northern District Judges Trim Backlog of Old Cases, THE RECORDER,
July 28,1992 (identifying complex litigation and public interest law suits as two factors
contributing to delays since the late 1970s, early 1980s, and discussing the particular
suits contributing to the docket problems of judges Orrich and Jensen); John Flynn
Rooney, Two Top Court's Motions Pending Report, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., March 1, 1993, at
1 (attributing delays to judges constantly being in trial, to motions being transferred to
other judges, and to cases being referred to magistrate judges for reports).
10 4 ADMNISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT REPORT OF
MOTIONS PENDING OVER Six MONTHS, Bench Trials Submitted Over Six Months Civil Cases
Pending Over Three Years 5 (March 31, 1992).
105Id.
1 06 1d. at 6.
10 71t is interesting to note that the socalled "pilot" districts, which adopted expense
and delay reduction plans conforming with the principles and guidelines specified in
the Civil Justice Reform Act, experienced a 10% decrease in the number of motions
pending during the same period. Civil Justice Reform Act Reports Show Drop in Backlog,
THE THIRD BRANCH, March 1993, at 6.
1081d.
109GEYH REPORT, supra note 23, at app. A, question 13.
1101d.
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It is, of course, possible to argue that a judge embarrassed into action by case
lists published pursuant to § 476 may reduce her backlog at the expense of
reasoned and reflective decision-making. One might fairly assume that such a
problem would be of special concern to the judges themselves. Indeed, the
'untoward effects" that § 476 might have on "the quality of judicial work" was
one of the Judicial Conference's primary objections to the provision at the time
it was being considered by Congress.111 Such a concern is, however, to a
considerable extent dispelled by the results of the questionnaire, which reflect
a high degree of satisfaction with § 476 by chief circuit judges--all of whom are
members of the Judicial Conference, who together constitute half of the
Conference's membership,112 and who, as Conference members, had objected
to the provision two years previously.
2. Complicating Factors
Assessing the impact of § 476 on delay is complicated by a variety of factors,
some suggesting that the impact of § 476 may be even greater than reported,
others suggesting that the impact may be less than reported, and still others
suggesting that its impact is unclear.
a. Section 476"s impact may be understated because the data do not reflect delays
eradicated before the first report was filed
The possibility that much of the indefensible delay that the section sought
to eradicate was eradicated between the time that the law was passed and the
first semiannual report was published suggests that the impact of § 476 was
even greater than reported. Alan Morrison offered anecdotal support for this
possibility in his testimony before the National Commission on Judicial
Discipline and Removal:
(P)ublic disclosure... appears to be having an effect. And I say appears
to, because there is a coincidental event related to me by a colleague
who said that shortly before the 30th of September last year he received
opinions in three cases from three different judges, all of which had
been awaiting decision for-I don't remember the period, but
something between a year and a half and two years. And when I
pointed out to him that the 30th of September was the bewitching hour
after which the cases would have to go on the tardy sheet, he suddenly
realized how this great coincidence had happened at once.
113
111 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
11228 U.S.C. § 331 (1988).
113HEARINGS BEFORE THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ONJUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOvAL
223 (1992) (Testimony of Alan Morrison, Esq.).
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b. Section 476"s impact may be understated because the reports do not supply all
information required by the statute
Most readily available copies of the semiannual reports prepared by the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts do not list case names, as
required by the Act.114 Thus, if two successive, semiannual reports list a
particular judge as having 25 motions pending more than six months, it is
impossible to tell whether the 25 motions listed in the second report are the
same as those listed in the first, or are 25 new motions. The net effect of failing
to identify cases by name, then, is that one cannot distinguish between the
judge with 25 motions all languishing over a year, and the judge with 50
motions all decided within a year. That, in turn, leaves the press and public
ill-equipped to assess whether the judge in question should be criticized for
failing to decide motions more expeditiously, or applauded for coping as best
she can with a burdensome docket.
c. Section 476"s impact may be overstated to the extent that the deterrent effect of
adverse publicity diminishes over time
The foregoing concern implies that the impact of § 476 in reducing delay
might be even greater if it were implemented with stricter adherence to
statutory requirements. On the other hand, one could argue that the utility of
the statute will diminish over time, as semiannual reports become more routine
and less newsworthy, and the judge's initial embarrassment at having her
backlogs published tapers off. Nevertheless, one may fairly assume that in
extreme cases, at least, delays will continue to attract the attention of the legal
press, which will, in turn continue to cause the desired chagrin among the
judges in question.
d. Section 476"s impact may be obscured by a host of independent variables affecting
caseflow
It bears reemphasis that the bulk of variables contributing to decisional delay
are outside the judges' control.115 Semiannual increases or declines in the
backlog of any given judge will obviously be affected by such factors as the
number, nature, and timing of cases and motions filed, whether there are
unfilled judicial vacancies in the district, and whether cases have been
transferred to the district by the multidistrict litigation panel.116
114 GEYH REPORT, supra note 23, at app. C.
115See supra Section II. A.
116 Civil Justice Reform Act Reports Show Drop in Backlog, THE THIRD BRANCH, March
1993, at 6.
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e. Section 476"s impact may be obscured by litigants "forum shopping" for venues
with less congested dockets
While the immediate effect of publishing a judge's pending motions, bench
trials and cases may be to embarrass her into keeping abreast of her docket, it
also furnishes litigants and their lawyers with information that may assist them
in choosing among available venues for filing suit. Thus, lawyers interested in
obtaining early trials for their clients have examined § 476 case lists, and
selected venues with fewer reported delays.117 If such a practice becomes
widespread, one effect could be to increase systemic efficiency by allocating
work more evenly among judicial districts. A second, more troubling effect
could be to reward inefficient districts by allocating a disproportionately
greater volume of work to their more efficient counterparts. At least to the
extent that inequitable caseload shifts occur between districts within a the same
circuit,118 however, circuit judicial councils and chief judges are in a position
to monitor the problem and respond, by pressuring less productive districts
and relieving overworked ones. 119 Even so, such forum shopping would
obscure the ultimate impact of § 476 in any given district.
IV. CONCLUSION
Section 476 of the Civil Justice Reform Act, which requires semiannual
publication of motions, bench trials and cases pending longer than a specified
time, should be greeted with guarded optimism. The threat of adverse publicity
has been a time honored means for chief circuit judges to reduce indefensible
decision-making delays among judges within the circuit. In enacting the Civil
Justice Reform Act, Congress recognized what chief circuit judges have long
appreciated: that men and women capable and honorable (and political)
enough to be appointed to the federal bench will wish to avoid the
embarrassment that would accompany publicized reports implicitly criticizing
their productivity. Notwithstanding a variety of factors complicating the
assessment of whether § 476 is having the desired effect in practice, there is
reason to believe that it is: delays have declined over the course of three
reporting periods, and the judges who administer the federal courts are
satisfied with its operation.
117Andrew Houlding, Burns Leads State's Federal Bench in Overdue Motions; Rulings
Awaited in 44 Cases for More Than Six Months, CONN. L. TRIB., December 23-30, 1991, at 2
(indicating that the practical effect of § 476 will be felt more in states with multiple
districts, where multiple venue choices are possible). Brenda Sapino, Airline Case an
All-Star Showdown; Plaintiffs Raced to Keep Anti-Trust Case Close to Home, TEX. LAw., July
6, 1992, at 1 (explaining that a lawyer's decision to file suit in Galveston, rather than
Houston, was based on data disseminated pursuant to § 476, which suggested that the
case would be adjudicated more promptly in Galveston).
118As reflected in the articles cited in the preceding footnote, the venue choices
confronting a litigant will routinely be between districts within the same state.
Houlding, supra note 117, at 2; Sapino, supra note 117, at 1.
119See supra Sections lI.B.l.b. and ll.B.2.b.
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